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In September, 1887, the Centennial of the Federal Con-
stitution was celebrated in Philadelphia. In February, i89o,
the Centennial of the Supreme Court of the United States
was celebrated in the city of New York. On each occasion
the Federal and State Judiciary joined with statesmen and
distinguished leaders of the bar in giving testimony to the
successful working of a Constitutional System, by which
firm barriers have been raised against the tyranny of political
assemblies. Its checks and delays aptly have been said by
James Russell Lowell to be "but obstacles in the way of the
people's whim and not of their will."
But our ears are dull of hearing if we have failed to
catch an undertone of murmuring and questioning. Par-
ticularly during the last decade alarm has been justly excited
in the hearts of those, to whom the Constitution is the great
palladium of our liberties.
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The spirit of criticism has attacked not' only the Federal
Constitution, but also the System as embodied in the State
Constitutions. Doubts have been raised as to the wisdom of
any written Constitution. The exercise by the judiciary of
the power of declaring statutes void, because in derogation of
constitutional provisions has been most vigorously assailed
as an unwarranted interference with the right of the people
to express their will through chosen representatives in Con-
gress or Legislature assepnbled. In some quarters this senti-
ment has taken very definite shape, and ominous threats are
made, extending even to the obliteration of the court by
whose judgment, it is said, the will of the sovereign people
is thwarted.
Political writers of reputation have given to this move-
ment the aid, which character and scholarship carries; and
we who believe that the way established by the Fathers of
the Republic is the better way, are called upon to defend
propositions which for nearly a century have passed current
and with little challenge.
Convinced that the prevalent scepticism of the advan-
tages of our Constitutional System is due in great measure
to a forgetfulness of the fundamental principles upon which
all free government rests, it is proper to recall the essential
distinction in theory between our government and those of
the countries from which our forefathers emigrated. This
distinction is sharply brought to mind when the words
"citizen" and "subject" are contrasted. In lands where
the inhabitants are "subjects," the government is an entity
existing apart and distinct from the people. There is a
"sovereign power" which exists in contradistinction to the
people governed. This sovereign power may be exercised
by an emperor, a czar, a king or a parliament; in either
case, an individual or a limited number of individuals is
assumed to possess sovereignty over the mass who are gov-
erned.
Tradition, custom, fear of rebellion, may restrain the
sovereign in the exercise of power, but the individual men
who constitute the nation are subjects of that sovereign.
The land from which we derive our language-the
great body of our laws and the fundamental principles of
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our liberties was governed by a sovereign. Parliament,
composed of King, Lords and Commons, was a sovereign
governing power-restrained, it is true, by tradition, custom,
and knowledge that the governed knew how to rebel, and
dared to fight, if need be, to protect their rights as freemen
-but still an absolute power. From time to time protests
were heard against this absolutism.
A few English judges have intimated that an act of
Parliament against Common Right was void; but the
accepted opinion has been, that Parliament absorbs to itself
all the Supreme Powers of Government ;--legislative, execu-
tive and judicial. There is no appeal within the law against
an edict of Parliament. To reverse it, there must be rebell-
ion, only to be justified upon general provocation and ability
to carry to a successful end.In his address at New York on the fiftieth anniversary
of the Federal Constitution, John Quincy Adams said this
doctrine of absolutism of Parliament was the moving cause
of our war of Independence:
"The English lawyers had decided that Parliament was omnipotent-
and Parliament in its omnipotence instead of trial by jury and the
habeas corpus, enacted Admiralty Courts in England to try Americans
for offences charged against them as committed in America ...
English liberties had failed them. From the omnipotence of Parlia-
ment the colonists appealed to the rights of men and the omnipotence
of the God of battles."
This spirit of the war of Independence was never more
forcibly expressed than in the words which Charles James
Fox placed in the mouth of the rebellious subjects of
James II.:
No, you have no property in dominion; dominion was vested in you,
as it is in every Chief Magistrate, for the benefit of the community
to be governed-it was a sacred trust delegated by compact ;-you have
abused that trust-you have exercised dominion for the purposes of
vexation and tyranny-not of comfort, protection and good order; and
we therefore resume the power which was originally ours. We recur
to the first principles of all government-the will of the many-and it
is our will that you shall no longer abuse your dominion.
Independence having been established by our fathers, the
government under which we live, repudiated not only the
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nomenclature but also the essential theory of government as
understood and enforced in the Old World. There is no
omnipotent person or body whose edicts control the people.
The divine right of the sovereign gave place to the divine
right to be free. The governed and the governors are one.
The body of freemen are the source of all power. Every
freeman is a citizen, and happily every man is now a free-
man.
There is no sovereign power which can limit, control, or
abridge the exercise by each freeman of the fundamental
rights of life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, which include
the acquisition, possession and enjoyment of property.
But while "the people" are recognized as the source of
all governmental power, we must be mindful not to be mis-
led by the flattering metaphors of orators as to the powers of
the "sovereign people." In a limited sense, which we will
seek hereafter more carefully to define, the people are
sovereign; but the phrase, as commonly used, has led to
many erroneous conclusions and deductions. It is certainly
illusive when it induces each of an audience to whom it is
addressed to regard himself as a "sovereign," possessing the
prerogative, either individually or in association with other
like "sovereigns," to exercise arbitrary or absolute power
over the property or rights of his fellow-citizens; and the
phrase "sovereign people" is equally objectionable when it
is used to give support to the idea that a majority of the
voters of a state possess,.in an absolute sense, power to con-
trol or direct the conduct, or abridge the natural rights of
freemen. The unlimited despotism of a majority is the most
dangerous form of tyranny.
In 1802, a distinguished senator noticed this insidious
flattery of the "sovereign people" in these words:
I hope, however, that the government and the people are now the
same, and I pray to God that what has been frequently remarked may
not, in this case, be discovered to be true; that they who have the
name of the people most often in their mouths, have their true interest
most seldom at their hearts.
The majority of voters are not a "sovereign power,"
and the nation at large does not bear to that majority the
relation which subjects bear to a sovereign.
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While there is a sense in- which we may regard the peo-
ple as sovereign, there is, also, high authority for a dignified
reserve in using the phrase.
Justice JAMES WILSON, in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dallas,
257, said:
To the Constitution of the United States, the term sovereign is
totally unknown. There is but one place where it could have been used
with propriety. But, even in that place, it would not, perhaps, have
comported with the delicacy of those who ordained and established that
Constitution. They might have announced themselves "sovereign
people of the United States ;" but, serenely conscious of the fact, they
avoided the ostentatious declaration.
The only sense in which the use of the word "sovereign"
is permissible, even when annexed to people, is to emphasize
the thought that a nation of freemen recognize no sovereign
power other than the Constitution, and laws made pursuant
thereto, which, by common consent, have been established
and enacted, to the end that each freeman may more per-
fectly enjoy his liberty and attain, in the largest measure,
the exercise of his natural rights. As was well said by Caleb
Cushing, in the House of Representatives:.
We did not constitute this government as the means of acquiring new
rights, but for the protection of old ones which nature had conferred
upon us, which the Constitution rightly regards as pre-existing rights,
and as to which all the Constitution does is to provide that these rights
-neither you-nor any power on earth shall alter, abrogate or abridge.
Free government exists not to control the actions of its
citizens as subjects-but to enable each man to enjoy his own
without let or hindrance, and to protect from the encroach-
ments of the lawless, those who are willing to live with due
recognition of the natural rights of others. In this sense only
the people are sovereign, that in them as an entirety, is the
source of the power conferred by common consent upon
certain governmental agencies to be exercised in accordance
with the terms of the grant for the common good.
The act of the people in framing a scheme of govern-
ment properly may be spoken of as the act of a "sovereign
power." It was consummated in the adoption of the Federal
Constitution. As John Quincy Adams said, "The constituent
sovereignty of the people was the basis of the Constitution."
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The congress upon which legislative power was conferred
did not thereby acquire "sovereign powers." There was only
a delegation of the power of enacting laws--of exercising
the legislative power upon the subjects which are within
the scope of national government as distinguished from
state government; matters concerning the people of the
United States and not the people of the several states. This
assertion is not made to support any doctrine of "strict con-
struction." That is a mere question of detail. For the
purposes of this discussion we concede the broadest con-
struction which any rational mind can give to the final
sentence in Article I § 8 of the Federal Constitution.
To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by
this Constitution in the government of the United States or in any
department or officer thereof.
The proposition which we maintain is that all legislative
powers exercised by Congress or state legislatures are
delegated powers, and hence must be exercised in accordance
with the terms of the instrument conferring the powers.
The source of power is the people, who in this sense are
sovereign-the government is of the people-but having
established, through the Constitution, a government of lim-
ited powers, and delegated to proper governmental agencies
the exercise of those powers-and having further provided
for the continued existence of those agencies through suc-
cessive elections and appointments, the sovereign power
rests.
The elections which from year to year are conducted in ac-
cordance with constitutional requirements are not the exer-
cise of sovereign power. The body of the people bound them-
selves in the Constitution to accept as servants for the
performance of official duty those whom a majority of lawful
voters might name for the service. Not only are those
elected, agents of the people, exercising delegated powers,
but the majority of the electors, who name those thus elected,
are themselves exercising a power delegated in the Constitu-
tion by the entire body to the electors. In legal effect the
Constitution is a continuing compact ;-in some respects
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very analogous to a partnership agreement. For certain pur-
poses the entire body agree that the act of the majority shall
bind all. In so acting the majority are the agents of the
entire body, and their act is efficient not as an exercise of
sovereign power, but because by the frame of government all
have agreed that elections shall be so held.
This doctrine of the delegation of power is as applicable
to the state as it is to the federal legislative body.
PENNA. CONSTITUTION Of 1776. Chapter I.
§ IV. That all power being originally inherent in and consequently
derived from the people, therefore all officers of government, whether
legislative or executive, are their trustees and servants, and at all times
accountable to them.
§ V. . . . And that the community hath an indubitable, unalien-
able and indefeasible right to reform, alter or abolish government, in
such manner as shall be by that community judged most conducive to
the public weal.
CONSTITUTION Of 1790. Preamble.
We, the people of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, ordain and
establish this Constitution for its government.
ARTICLE I. § I.
The legislative power of this Commonwealth shall be vested in a
General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives.
ARTICLE IX. § II.
That all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments
are founded on the authority, and instituted for their peace, safety and
happiness. For the advancement of those ends they have, at all times,
an unalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform or abolish their
government, in such manner as they may think proper.
§ XXVI. To guard against transgressions of the high powers which
we have delegated we declare that everything in this article is excepted
out of the general powers of government, and shall forever remain
inviolate.
The same propositions are found in the Preamble of the
Constitution of 1873 and in the Declaration of Rights,
Article I, § I and § XXVII.
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A precedent for limitations upon legislative power is
found in the Royal Charter for the Province of Pennsyl-
vania granted to William Penn, where the legislative power
of the Provincial Assembly is thus qualified; after the clause
in which the law-making power is conferred is the following
proviso:
Provided, nevertheless, that the said laws be consonant to reason,
and be not repugnant or contrary, but (as near as conveniently may -be)
agreeable to the laws, statutes and rights of England.
Similar limitations are found in other colonial charters.
These preliminary suggestions are made not for the pur-
.pose of particularly defining the extent of the powers of
Congress or state legislature, but to emphasize two car-
dinal principles.
First.-The body upon whom legislative power is con-
ferred is not a sovereign or omnipotent body. It is an
assembly of agents or trustees to whom the body of the
people have delegated the duty of legislation. The people
remain the ultimate source of power, in them alone is vested
the constituent sovereignty. The extent of the power thus
delegated is to legislate, one of the independent functions of
government, but not the attribute of sovereignty or absolute
government.
Second.-The power of legislation has not been conferred
without limitations. In the case of the National Congress no
general power to legislate has been conferred, and by the
terms of the instrument defining the extent of the powers,
none pass except those expressly mentioned, and such as are
properly incidental to render effectual those expressly con-
ferred.
In the case of state legislatures, the powers of legisla-
tion conferred are to legislate generally. But from the
earliest Constitution, as is shown by the preceding quota-
tions, the Bill of Rights operated as a limitation upon the
otherwise general legislative power. We fully recognize the
distinction between the construction of the federal and state
constitutions. One body is of limited and the other of
general legislative powers; but the general powers of the
state legislature are subject to many expressed restrictions,
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and perhaps more important than all, it is always to be
remembered that the powers of Congress and the powers of
state legislatures are legislative only. Legislation must
he distinguished from a general exercise of sovereign power.
A body to whom only the duty of legislation has been dele-
gated does not thereby acquire sovereign power. It is not
legislation to decree that the property of A shall become the
property of B. Such an enactment is void, not because of
any constitutional prohibition or limitation, but because it
is not legislation. Examples could be multiplied, a single
illustration is sufficient. A sovereign parliament might
possess absolute and arbitrary power. A legislature con-
vened to legislate does not. When any legislative body
transcends the limit of legislation, Lord Chatham's words in
questioning the arbitrary exercise of power by the House of
Commons well apply:
Tyranny is detestable in every shape, but in none so formidable as
when it is assumed and exercised by a number of tyrants.
In Sharpless v. Philadelphia, 21 Pa., St. 147, Black,
Woodward and Knox pointed out this limitation upon legis-
lative action with great clearness.
BLACK, C. J., p. 167.
Perhaps there is nothing in the books which shows the tenacity with
which the court has adhered to the letter of the Constitution in deter-
mining the extent of legislative power, more plainly than the doubt
which was once entertained (io Watts, 63) whether the want of an
express inhibition did not permit the Assembly to take one man's prop-
erty and give it to another. The Constitution does prohibit it. It is not
within the general grant of legislative power. It would be gross
usurpation of judicial authority, and would violate the very words of
Section XI, Art. IX. The legislature could not make such a rescript
(for it would not be law), any more than they could order an innocent
man to be put to death without trial.
P. i68.
I do not mean to assert that every act which the legislature may
choose to call a tax law is constitutional. The whole of a public ,burden
cannot be thrown upon a single individual, under pretence of taxing
him, nor can one county be taxed to pay the debt of another, nor one
portion of the state to pay the tax of the whole state. These things
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are not excepted from the powers of the legislature, because they did
not pass to the Assembly by the general grant of legislative power. A
prohibition was not necessary. An act of Assembly, commanding or
authorizing them to be done, would not be a law, but an attempt to
pronounce a judicial sentence or order or decree. .
Neither has the legislature any constitutional right to create a public
debt, or to lay a tax, or to authorize any municipal corporation to do it,
in order to raise funds for a mere private purpose. No such authority
passed to the Assembly by the general grant of legislative power. This
would not be legislation. Taxation is a mode of raising revenue for
public purposes. When it is prostituted to objects in no way connected
with the public interests or welfare, it ceases to be taxation and becomes
plunder. Transferring money, from the owners of it into the possession
of those who have no title to it, though it be done under the name
and form of a tax, is unconstitutional for all the reasons which forbid
the legislature to usurp any other power not granted to them.
In this case, the court held that public money raised by
taxation might be applied to aid the building of a railroad,
because the use was public; but in Loan Association v.
Topeka, 20 Wallace, 655, it was pointed out that public
moneys could not be applied to the aid of a manufacturing
enterprise--MILLER, J., saying:
Where the purpose for which the tax was to be issued could no
longer be justly claimed to have this public character, but was purely in
aid of private or personal objects, the law authorizing it was beyond
the legislative power.
KNox, J., p. i85. The right of this court to declare an act of the
legislature unconstitutional, is unquestionable, and I may safely add,
unquestioned.
In ascertaining whether there has been this clear usurpation by the
law-making power, I agree with the Chief Justice, and Mr. Justice
WOODWARD, that the tests to be applied are: First-Is the act in the
nature of a legislative power? Second-Does the Constitution expressly,
or by necessary implication, forbid the exercise of such power?
The two questions are closely assimilated. If it is not in the nature
of a legislative power, the Constitution does, by necessary implication,
forbid the General Assembly from exercising it. All attempts upon the
part of the legislature to exercise the class of powers committed to the
care of the judiciary, are clearly unauthorized and unconstitutional.
For there is a necessary implication arising from the organization
and recognition of the judicial branch of the government, that its
authority shall be supreme, and its jurisdiction exclusive upon subjects
committed to its care and upon questions to be determined by its judg-
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It must be conceded that there are such rights in every free govern-
ment beyond the control of the state. A government which recognizes
no such rights, which held the lives, the liberty, and the property of
its citizens subject at all times to the absolute disposition and unlimited
control of even the most democratic of power, is after all but a despot-
ism. It is true that it is a despotism of the many, of the majority, if
you choose to call it so, but it is none the less a despotism. It may
well be doubted if a man is to hold all that he is accustomed to call his
own, all in which he has placed his happiness, and the security of which
is essential to that happiness, under the unlimited dominion of others,
whether it is not wiser that this power should be exercised by one man
than -by many.
The theory of our governments, state and national, is opposed to
the deposit of unlimited power anywhere. The executive, the legislative,
and the judicial branches of these governments are all of limited and
defined powers.
A clear apprehension of the rule, that the enactment by
a legislative assembly must be legislative in its nature, in
order that it may be of force, renders it unnecessary to dis-
cuss the question, whether legislation not expressly pro-
hibited, but in violation of what is styled common right, is
void. Cases are often suggested which shock the sense of
natural right and yet which do not come within any express
prohibition of the Bill of Rights or of the Constitution. The
ment. Hence the legislature cannot lawfully grant a new trial in a case
once determined. This court might with equal right declare, that a bill
which has passed through all the forms of legislation should again be
submitted to a vote of the Senate and House of Representatives, and
presented to the Executive for his approval or rejection, as for the legis-
lature to say that a verdict of the jury, and a judgment of a court should
be set aside, in order to give the parties litigant another opportunity
to ascertain where right and justice belong.
It is unnecessary to multiply instances or words to prove that the
legislature cannot rightfully exercise judicial or executive authority.
It is confined to its own sphere of action, separate and distinct from the
other departments of the government.
WOODWA.RD, J., p. 158. When the legislature. disregards the distribu-
tion made of the powers of government, among the three co-ordinate
departments, or the restrictive clauses in the body of the instrument, or
the reservations of the Bill of Rights, or the grants of the Government
of the United States-the judiciary, whose office it is to expound the
law. may, and I hold are bound to declare the act unconstitutional and
void.
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true solution of most of these cases is that the attempted act
of the legislature is not legislation. It may be an encroach-
ment on the prerogative of the executive. It may be an
attempt to exercise judicial powers. It may be an act
beyond the power of free government. If it come not within
the definition of legislation, it is of no force. If, however,
the act be legislative in its character and not prohibited by
some express provision of the Constitution, then the legisla-
ture alone is responsible for the exercise of its discretion-
then the discretion having been exercised, no other depart-
ment of government can review the question and refuse
obedience to the law enacted by the body to which under our
form of government the law-making power has been
delegated.
From the foregoing it would appear that legislative
enactments are of no force:
I. When prohibited by the express language of the
Constitution.
2. When under the guise of legislation, statutes not
legislative in their character are promulgated.
Such edicts or rescripts are not within the chart of legis-
lative authority and do not carry with them the duty of
obedience. But how is this question of duty to be deter-
mined. How, when the interest of one calls for the enforce-
ment of such enactment and the interest of another denies
its validity, is the issue to be settled.
In his famous dissenting opinion in Eakin v. Raub, 12
S. & R., 330, in denying the power of the judiciary to declare
a statute of no force, because unconstitutional, Judge GIBSON
was driven to the conclusion that in cases really affecting
the vital interest of the citizen, his only recourse was to
determine the issue for himself and to take the personal
responsibility of resisting, even to the death the enforcement
of a statute which was not law.
The right is peremptorily asserted and examples of monstrous viola-
tions of the Constitution are put in a strong light by way of example;
such as taking away the trial by jury, the elective franchise, or sub-
verting religious liberty. But any of these would be such a usurpa-
tion of the political rights of the citizens, as would work a change
in the very structure of the government; or, to speak more prop-
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erly, it would itself be a revolution, which, to counteract, would
justify even insurrection; consequently, a judge might lawfully em-
ploy every instrument of official resistance within his reach. By this
I mean, that while the citizen should resist with pike and gun, the judge
might co-operate with habeas corpus and mandamus. It would be his
duty, as a citizen, to throw himself into the breach, and, if it should be
necessary, perish there.
The opposite view is most tersely put in an early Georgia
case. I refer to the opinion of Judge CHARLTON in Green-
field v. Ross, Charlton's Report, 176.
From passion, from unprincipled ambition, from the illusions of
ignorance, from the ebullition of political acrimony or misguided zeal,
it is very easy to perceive the possibility of an unconstitutional act of
the legislature. What, then, is the remedy? A recourse to the people's
vengeance? Must the people be called upon to defend, in their aggre-
gate capacity, that compact and those privileges which flowed directly
from the source of their volition? If this is the remedy, our boasted
republicanism is nothing more than systematic anarchy; and it would
be therefore better for us to repose in the thorny protection of an
absolute monarchy. Is the remedy found in the patient endurance of
the evil until succeeding legislatures think proper to repeal the uncon-
stitutional enactment? This would be worse than popular insurrection,
because it presupposes an outrage upon the constitutional rights longer
than ought to be borne by American citizens. The iemedy can only
be found, then, in the wisdom and independence of the judicial depart-
ment. Here the passions, the feelings and the interests which may and
do sway deliberative bodies cannot be found. This department is aided
by all the lights which cautious and dispassionate consideration can
afford; and it is governed by maxims of jurisprudence which apertis
foribus offer a secure asylum to every citizen whose weakness or
injuries solicit admission and protection. This department cannot
deviate from those -fixed principles which for ages the approbation of
mankind has stamped with the seals of truth and authority. In this
respect the judicial is unlike the legislative department, whose func-
tions are regulated by the caprice of an arbitrary discretion. Under this
view of the judicial department it is surely the best, the safest, and in
our republic can be the only mediation between a citizen and an uncon-
stitutional act of the legislature.
The heresy, contained in his dissenting opinion, our great
Chief Justice subsequently recanted in Menges v. Wertman,
I Pa. St. 218, saying:
In the other states the courts have often pronounced acts of legisla-
tion to be unconstitutional, with the acquiescence of the legislature and
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the people. But by giving too much scope to the principles that this
authority is to be exercised only in extreme cases, we have bound our
hands so far as to have nearly relinquished the authority itself. It
would ill become me to impute blame for it to the distinguished men
who have preceded me, or to those with whom I am or have been
associated; for it is known that I went beyond them in restricting the
constitutional power of the court. My theory, however, seems to have
been tacitly disavowed by the late convention, which took no action on
the subject, though the power has notoriously been claimed and
exerted. But experience has taught me the futility of mere theory.
There must be some independent organ to arrest unconstitutional power.
It would be useless for the people to impose restrictions on legislation if
the acts of the agents were not subject to revision.
The same sentiment was expressed from the Bench in
the report of the argument in Norris v. Clyiner, 2 Pa. St.
277.
It is a striking coincidence that when Judge GIBSON was
driven from his original position by the argument of the
necessity of the case, he followed the line of reasoning
adopted by Mr. Calhoun in one of his great arguments in
the Senate:
But it will be asked how the court obtained the power to pronounce
a law unconstitutional when it comes in conflict with that instrument.
I do not deny that it possesses the right, but I can by no means concede
that it was derived from the Constitution. It had its origin in the
necessity of the case. Where there are two or more rules established,
one from a higher, the other from a lower authority, which may come
into conflict in applying them to a particular case the judge cannot
avoid pronouncing in favor of the superior against the inferior. It is
from this necessity, and this alone, that the power was derived. It had
no other origin. That I have traced it to its true source will be manifest
from the fact that it is a power which so far from being conferred
exclusively'in the Supreme Court as is insisted, belongs to every court,
inferior and superior-state and federal.
This quotation is most instructive because it emphasizes
the important principle that courts in passing upon the con-
stitutionality of statutes exercise a purely judicial function.
Their judgment is entered in the particular case upon a
definite issue raised whether a certain legislative enactment
is law, and the court must decide that issue in order to give
judgment between the parties.
Strictly speaking, the judgment binds no one except the
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parties. The statute is not repealed or annulled by the judg-
ment of the court. It still has its place in the statute book,
but the court judicially determines that while the statute has
the form of law, it does not affect the rights of the litigants
who invoke the higher law of the Constitution. But although
the court does not override the legislature, the moral force
of its decision may be prevailing-it gives promise that if
the same issue is raised between other litigants the same
judgment will be entered. The judicial branch of the gov-
ernment comes into no conflict with the legislature-each
continues to move in its appointed course. This is the true
view of the judicial function. While it may not place the
judiciary in apparent elevation as a Court of Appeal above
the legislature-the constant recognition of the limited effect
of the judicial judgment will tend to conserve the true influ-
ence of the courts. The substance not the form of power
should be desired. The less the appearance, the longer will
it continue.
In the earlier history of the states, the courts were rarely
called upon to declare acts of the legislature unconstitutional.
In our Commonwealth for the half century following the
Constitution of 1790 there is not a single instance where a
statute was determined to be unconstitutional-but there
was a uniform consensus of judicial opinion (with the excep-
tion of the dissenting opinion of C. J. GIBSON already
quoted) that the judiciary must have the power of declaring
a statute to be of no force, if enacted in disregard of the
higher law of the Constitution.
In the minutes of the Council of Censors in 1784, the
committee appointed to point out the defects in the Constitu-
tion of 1776, inter alia reported:
Your committee conceives the said Constitution to be in this respect
materially defective, referring to the power of the legislature to remove
the judges:
Because if the assembly should pass an unconstitutional law, and the
judges have virtue enough to refuse to obey it, the same assembly could
instantly remove them.
This indicates that the men who took part in forming
our government had a very definite opinion that an uncon-
stitutional law was no law-and that the. test of virtue in a
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judge -would be his refusal to obey it-by which we under-
stand that in the performance of his judicial duty he should
give it no effect in rendering judgments.
I shall not attempt to refer to the numerous cases in which
the courts of the several states committed themselves to
the right of the judiciary to declare an unconstitutional
law to be of no force. There is a full collection in Mr. Meigs'
article "On the Relation of the Judiciary to the Constitu-
tion," American Law Review, 'March-April, 1885, p. 175,
etc., and Professor Thayer's article-"The Origin and
Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,"
VII Harvard Law Review, 129.
I refer only to the striking charge of Judge PATERSON
in the U. S. Circuit Court for this district, in 1795,-Van
'Horne's Lessee -v. Dorrance, 2 Dallas, 304, when he said:
What are legislatures? Creatures of the Constitution; they owe
their existence to the Constitution; they derive their powers from the
Constitution; it is their commission; and, therefore, all their acts must
be conformable to it, or else they will be void. The Constitution is the
work or will of the people themselves, in their original, sovereign, and
unlimited capacity. Law is the work or will of the legislature in their
derivative and subordinate capacity. The one is the work of the creator,
and the other of the creature. The Constitution fixes limits to the exer-
cise of legislature or legislative authority, and prescribes the orbit
within which it must move. In short, gentlemen, the Constitution is
the sun of the political system, around which all legislative, executive
and judicial bodies must revolve. Whatever may 'be the case of other
countries, yet in this there can be no doubt-that every act of the legis-
lature, repugnant to the Constitution, is absolutely void.
And the opinion of C. J. TILGHMAN, in Eakin v. Raub,
12 S. & R., 330:
It will be sufficient to say, that I adhere to the opinion which I have
frequently expressed, that when a judge is convinced, beyond doubt, that
an act has been passed in violation of the Constitution, he is bound
to declare it void, by his oath, by his duty to the party who has brought
the cause before him, and to the people, the only source of legitimate
power, who, when they formed the Constitution of the state, expressly
declared that certain things
"Were excepted out of the general powers of government, and should
forever remain inviolate."
The people declared also on their adoption of the Constitution of the
United States:
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"That it should be the supreme law of the land. and that the judges
in every state should be bound thereby, anything in the constitution
or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding."
Upon this subject I have never entertained .but one opinion, which
has been strengthened by reflection, and fortified by the concurring senti-
ments of the Supreme Court of the United States, as well as of lawyers,
judges and statesmen of the highest standing in all parts of the United
States of America. Nevertheless, the utmost deference is due to the
opinion of the legislature,--so great, indeed, that a judge would be
unpardonable. who in a doubtful case should declare a law to be void.
And Judge DUNCAN in the same case:
Maintaining, as I do, the power and the duty of the court to decide
upon the constitutionality of all acts of the legislature, yet it is one
which all courts will approach with caution and circumspection, and
with every proper respect for a co-ordinate branch of the government,
and with great reluctance will they pronounce an act of the legislature
unconstitutional, and only where it comes in undoubted collision with
the Constitution of the United States, or with that of this state. But
it is a duty, however irksome, which they are bound to perform, without
regard to personal considerations; for no principle can be better estab-
lished-none more conducive to personal liberty and security of property,
-none of which the people of this free country can more justly boast,-
none which so pre-eminently distinguishes our American Constitution
over every other country and government, than the dottrine which has
prevailed since the formation in the courts of all these states, from
Maine to Georgia, that the people possess the sovereign right to limit
their lawgiver, and that acts contrary to the Constitution are not bind-
ing as laws. The concurrence of statesmen, of legislators and of jurists,
uniting in the same construction of the Constitution, may insure confi-
dence in that construction.
Even C. J. GIBSON, in the dissenting opinion before
cited, recognized that the limitations of the Federal Consti-
tution must be enforced by the courts, distinguishing that
from the State Constitution because of the provision.
In Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch, 137, MARSHALL, C. J.,
settled the law for all time in the federal courts:
The question, whether an act, repugnant to the Constitution, can
become the law of the land, is a question deeply interesting to the
United States; but, happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its
interest. It seems only necessary to recognize certain principles, sup-
posed to have been long and well established, to decide it.
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future
government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to
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their own happiness is the basis on which the whole American fabric
has been created. The exercise of this original right is very great
exertion; nor can it, nor ought it, to be frequently repeated. The prin-
ciples, therefore so established, are deemed fundamental. And as the
authority from which they proceed is supreme, and can seldom act,
they are designated to be permanent.
The Constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable
by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts,
and like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to
alter it.
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act
contrary to the Constitution is not law; if the latter part be true, then
written constitutions are absurd attempts on the part of the people, to
limit a power in its own nature illimitable.
If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the Constitution, is void,
does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them
to give it effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it
constitute a rule as operative as if it was a law? This would be to
overthrow in fact what was established in theory; and would seem, at
first view, an absurdity too gross to be insisted on. It shall, however,
receive a more attentive consideration.
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must
of necessity expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with
each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.
So if a law be in opposition to the Constitution; if both the law and
Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either
decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution;
or conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the law; the court
must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This
is of the very essence of judicial duty.
If, then, the courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution
is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution,
and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both
apply.
Those, then who controvert the principle that the Constitution is to
be considered, in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity
of maintaining that the courts must close their eyes on the Constitution,
and see only the law.
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written consti-
tutions. It would declare that an act which, according to the principles
and theory of our government, is entirely void, is yet, in practice, com-
pletely obligatory, it would declare that if the legislature shall do what
is expressly forbidden, such act, notwithstanding the express prohibition,
is in reality effectual. It would be giving to the legislature a practical
and real omnipotence, with the same breath which professes to restrict
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their powers within narrow limits, it is prescribing limits, and declaring
that those limits may be passed at pleasure.
That it thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest
improvement on political institutions, a written constitution, would of
itself be sufficient in America, where written constitutions have been
viewed, with so much reverence, for rejecting the construction. . .
Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to the Con-
stitution of the United States, if that Constitution forms no rule for
his government? If it is closed upon him, and cannot be inspected by
him?
If such be the real state of things, this is worse than solemn mockery.
To prescribe, or to take this oath, becomes equally a crime.
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring
what shall be the supreme law of the land, the Constitution itself is
first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but
those only which shall be made in pursuance of the Constitution have
that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the Constitution of the United
States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential
to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the Constitution is
void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that
instrument.
And there is no better statement of the rule than in the
opinion of the several judges of our Supreme Court in
Sharpless v. Philadelphia, 21 Pa. St. 147.
BLACK, C. J., p. i6o. The powers bestowed on the state government
were distributed by the Constitution to the three great departments:
the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. The power to make laws
was granted in Section I of Art. I, by the following words: "The legis-
lative power of this Commonwealth shall vest in a general assembly,
which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." It is
plain that the force of these general words, if there had been nothing
else to qualify them, would have given to the Assembly an unlimited
power to make all such laws as they might think proper. They would
have had the whole omnipotence of the British Parliament. But the
absolute power of the people themselves has been previously limited by
the Federal Constitution, and they could not bestow on the legislature
authority which had already been given to Congress. The judicial
and executive powers were also lodged elsewhere, and the legislative
department was forbidden to trench upon the others by an implication
as clear as words could make it. The jurisdiction of the Assembly was
still further confined by that part of the Constitution called the
"Declaration of Rights," which, in twenty-five sections, carefully
enumerated the reserved rights of the people, and closes by declaring
that "everything in this article is excepted out of the general powers
of the government, and shall remain forever inviolate." The General
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Assembly cannot, therefore, pass any law to conflict with the rightful
authority of Congress, nor perform a judicial or executive function,
nor violate the popular privileges reserved by the Declaration of Rights,
nor change the organic structure of the government, nor exercise any
other power prohibited in the Constitution. If it does any of these things,
the judiciary claims, and in clear cases has always exercised, the right
to declare -such acts void.
WOODWARD, J., p. i79. The striking peculiarity in the civil and
political condition of the people of this country, is that they live under
the jurisdiction of two separate and distinct governments both formed
by themselves, and the powers of each limited by written constitutions.
The people of Pennsylvania, made absolutely free, sovereign, and inde-
pendent, on the fourth day of July, 1776, settled for themselves a frame
of government which, as modified in the present Constitution, organizes
the various departments of a republican government, legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial; and vests in them, not specific and enumerated
powers, but legislative power, executive power, and judicial power.
Whatever is in the nature of these three governmental powers (and
for their nature we must refer ourselves to the principles of political
science) belongs to these departments 'respectively, but not without
limitations. The Bill of Rights is a series of reservations out of the
powers granted to these departments, and concludes with a solemn
declaration in these words: "To guard against transgressions of the
high powers which we have delegated, we declare that everything in
this article is excepted out of the general powers of government, and
shall forever remain inviolate." The primary questions, therefore, that
arises upon the constitutionality of an act of assembly, are first: Is it
in the nature of legislative power; and secondly, does it trench upon
any of the reservations in the Bill of Rights? If the first of these ques-
tions can be answered affirmatively, and the other negatively, the
resulting conclusion is that the act is constitutional. So far in regard to
the State Constitution. ....
P. 183. I have no doubt of the right and duty of the judiciary to
declare a law unconstitutional, when it clearly contravenes any of the
provisions of the State or Federal Constitution; but it is a power to
be exercised with great caution. For nearly fifty years of our political
existence, under the Constitution of 179O, no act of Assembly was
set aside for unconstitutionality. Judges claimed the power, and said
they would exercise it in clear cases, but in all that period no case arose
which, in their judgment, was clear enough to justify the exercise of the
power; and it is well known that that great light of this bench, so
recently extinguished, stood opposed, for many years, to the existence
of any such judicial power. Since the Constitution of 1838 was adopted.
several acts of assembly have been declared unconstitutional, but they
were all clear cases.
Although there is a line of cases in various states, and
in some of the federal courts, in which acts of the legis-
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lature have been declared unconstitutional as violative of
common right without reference to any particular clause of
the Constitution; careful examination will show that the
real ground of objection to the statute declared void was
that it was not legislative in its tenor, and the judgment of
the court would have been better supported had this reason
been given; reference is made to several of these cases in
the opinion of BLACK, C. J., already quoted (21 Pa. St.,
162).
The citations which have been made show, that the men
whom we are taught to reverence as the sages of American
constitutional law did not doubt the power of courts, in
settling the rights of litigants, to treat as null legislative acts
promulgated in disregard to the limitations, which the people
have placed upon the powers of those to whom our earliest
Constitution in defining the relations of officials to the
people, fittingly referred as
All officers of government, whether legislative or executive, are their
trustees and servants, and at all times accountable to them.
When due recognition is given to these principles, the
community will truly recognize that
Mankind made a long step-a great stride when he declared that
minorities should not rule-a still higher and nobler advance had been
made when it was decided that majorities could only rule through
regular and legal forms.
The true theory of Constitutional Government as against
the unlimited power of the legislature or of a law-making
majority, has never been more clearly stated than in the
words of the great statesman to whom I have already
referred.
I know that it is not only the opinion of a large majority of our coun-
try, but it may be said to be the opinion of the age, that the very beau
ideal of a perfect government is the government of a majority acting
through a representative body, without check or limitation on its
power . . . but
The necessary tendency of all governments based upon the will of an
absolute majority without constitutional check or limitation of power,
is to breed corruption, anarchy and despotism; and this whether the
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will of the majority be expressed directly through an assembly of the
people themselves or by their representatives.
The government of the absolute majority instead of being the govern-
ment of the people is but the government of the strongest interests,
and when not efficiently checked is the most tyrannical and oppressive
that can be devised.
To maintain the ascendency of the Constitution over the law-making
majority is the great and essential point on which the success of the
system must depend. Unless that ascendency can be preserved, the
most necessary consequence must be that the laws will supersede the
Constitution.
That I may not seem to place too much stress on the
views of a statesman, some of whose opinions have not stood
the stress of time, I would add to the words of Mr. Calhoun,
a brief quotation from one who, on the distinctive issues of
their day, was altogether opposed to him:
This annihilation of the individual by merging him on the state lies
at the foundation of despotism. The nation is too often the grave of the
man. This is the more monstrous because the very end of the state,
of the organization of the nation, is to secure the individual in all his
rights, and especially to secure the rights of the weak. Here is the
fundamental idea of political association. In an unorganized society
with no legislature, no tribunal, no empire, rights have no security.
Force predominates over rights. W. E. CHANNING.
After the judiciary has done its part there still remains
a wide field for legislative action in making effectual the
constitutional guarantees of successful free government.
We have heard much of the indifference of legislators
to constitutional limitations. -By some this indifference is
attributed to a prevailing sentiment that such questions are
for the courts. This is a radical error. We have already
seen that by some high authorities the duty of the judiciary
has been founded on the obligation of their oaths to support
the Constitution. The same oath has been taken by every
legislator, and no man is worthy to sit in any American
legislative body upon whose conscience that oath does not
rest with binding force, and upon whose official conduct the
principles of the Constitution are not ever present as the
controlling governor. We must not hide from ourselves the
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knowledge that the intense interest which our people have
taken in the material development of the state and the
absorbing devotion to bettering their physical condition has
distracted the minds of the c6mmunity too much from atten-
tion to the principles of free government. It is in no spirit
of criticism I refer to this. We all know that in our own
professional lives, our attention is largely absorbed in con-
troversies and consultations in which the public aspect of the
laws have but little part. Recognizing this truth, the time
spent in this meeting will not have been wasted if our minds
are recalled to a serious contemplation of the fundamental
principles of free government, the perpetuation of which is
the only pledge for a continuation of the conditions under
which our material interests will prosper in the future as
they have in the past. The Legislature of Pennsylvania has
always been largely composed of lawyers. If the lawyers of
that body would carry with them a due sense of responsi-
bility and check all legislation which, upon its face, clearly
violates constitutional provisions, the courts would be
relieved from cases, the constant determination of which
brings the legislature into public contempt.
But the function of the legislature in giving effect to the
Constitution is not limited to refraining from legislation
which the courts will nullify.
As has been already pointed out, the power of the State
Legislature in the field of legislation is without qualification,
except in so far as expressly restricted by constitutional pro-
hibition. Within the delegated field their discretion is
untrammeled, and not subject to review; upon the members
of the legislative body rests the ultimate responsibility, for a
faithful adherence to the principles of free government. The
possibilities of legislative power are sufficiently great to per-
mit wide departure from the traditions of the men who
founded our states, without stepping beyond constitutional
lines. The genius of free institutions may be destroyed
without impairing the guarantees of the written Constitu-
tion. We have inherited traditions for whose preservation
we must rely upon the legislature. In an age of great intel-
lectual activity, when speculative thought has become deeply
interested in governmental and economic problems, it is easy
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for the legislature, while still within the terms of our written
Constitution, to be regardless of principles which have
heretofore controlled. A new generation has come to think
that a nation can be reformed by the machinery of new laws;
and each session of the legislature is flooded with bills, some
of which become laws, whose purpose is to establish rules of
conduct, which do not conform to the habits of thought or
action of the great body of the community. Such laws are a
nullity-not by judicial judgment, but by the common con-
sent of the people. They stand on the statute book a dead.
letter, and by their existence tend to destroy public respect
for law. If any lesson can be learned from the history of
democracy, it is-that statutes must substantially express the
common conscience of the community; it is possible that in
governments where there is a sovereign power other than the
people, statutes may be enacted to educate the community to
higher standards-such is not the history of true growth in
a democracy-the reform must first come into the life of the
people, then it may find expression in statutes.
The functions of government in a democracy should be
few.
The government is best which allows the largest amount
of individual liberty compatible with good order and tran-
quillity . . . and improvement in political science will
be found to consist in throwing off many of the restraints
enforced by law and once deemed necessary to an organized
society.
In the Bill of Rights is this clause:
No man can of right be compelled to attend, erect or support any
place of religious worship, or to maintain any ministry against his
consent.
All recognize that by freedom from enforced support-the
revenues of religious societies have been largely augmented.
In this there is a lesson which can be properly applied.
Legislative appropriations to charities have been greatly
increased during the last decade. While there are certain
dependent classes for whose support the state may properly
appropriate public funds or provide institutions for their
care, the legislature will best conserve the spirit of free insti-
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tutions by leaving charities generally to the individual care
of its citizens. While worthy institutions might feel the
sudden withdrawal of state aid-the history of charities
which have never received any aid from the public treasury
shows that to them flows the stream of private beneficence
which immediately turns in large measure from those having
the support of the state.
Under guise of the exercise of the police power bills are
introduced at each session of the legislature which while they
may not violate the letter of the Constitution tend to make
the body of the people impotent, without manhood, self-
reliance or any of the attributes of freemen. We all recog-
nize that as communities become dense, the legislature is
properly called upon to adopt new regulations to protect the
lives, health and property of citizens living in thickly popu-
lated communities. Subjection to such rules and regulations
is the only condition upon which life can be comfortably and
safely maintained, and every man who locates himself in
such community surrenders some part of his individual
liberty in consideration of the restraint which law places
upon his neighbors for his protection-but the exercise of
the police power is one which always calls for the highest
political discretion upon the part of law-makers. Laws must
not exceed the reasonable standard which the common senti-
ments of the community demand, else the government
assumes to the people the attitude of an external sovereign
and the sentiment of freedom and independence dies. The
law should never undertake to supply a community with any-
thing better than they can win for themselves, else the
recipients of the law's good things, become accustomed to
look to it rather than to themselves for the comforts of
living. In all this class of legislation, the legislature has
full scope for the exercise of a wise discretion.
This category could be enlarged, but further discussion
of detail is unnecessary, the principles have been illustrated.
Every effort which tends to elevate the standard of our
political and social life should receive the support of all
right-thinking citizens, but if we have read history aright
we have learned that the only forces which work efficiently
towards such elevation are those which reach and renovate
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the character of the individual citizen. To promulgate a
law prescribing a rule of action not according with the daily
life and standards of the body of the people is worse than an
idle form. That statute becomes merely a dead letter, and
the administration of the law is brought into contempt. Our
national, state and municipal life has much still to gain. We
know it is far from perfect, but the remedy is not'in framing
statutes based upon ideals which are not those of the people.
The advance can only be made when the people have them-
selves absorbed the idea and seek to realize it. To excite the
desire for such higher standard is the true work of
reformers, but the work will never be effectually done until
there is a recognition that the agencies of government have
none of the attributes of sovereign power. That the source
of all governmental power is in the "governed," and that
laws are effectually enforced only when they express the will
of the freemen who live under them.
Every reflecting man will admit that a legislator who
knows the clauses of the written Constitution, and who is
embued with the spirit of those unwritten constitutions
which are synonymous with free institutions, has full field
for the exercise of an intelligent discretion in the perform-
ance of his duty not as a member of a "sovereign body," but
as a "trustee and servant" of the people, remembering that
to him and his fellow-servants has been delegated the duty
not of government but of law-making, subject to the restric-
tions expressed in the Constitution.
If legislators would perform their duties in remembrance
of these principles there would be little to be done by the
judiciary in enforcing constitutional limitations. So long as
so-called legislation is enacted in forgetfulness of the Con-
stitution, the judiciary must remain as a bulwark for the pro-
tection of the rights of the individual freeman.
I would sum up the results of this paper in these proposi-
tions:
First-The judiciary should have the support of the bar
in the performance of its highest function, the declaring of
statutes to be of no force when in derogation of rights
secured by the Constitution or Bill of Rights. The exercise
of this power is necessary to maintain the integrity of our
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system of government. The other alternatives are passive
submission to the unrestrained power of a legislative assem-
bly, the most arbitrary of all tyrannies, or the anarchy which
would follow if each citizen should undertake to be the judge
of the constitutionality of legislation whenever it seriously
ran counter to his interests. The present and coming
generation can safely follow Chief Justice Gibson and con-
clude that the exercise of this power by the judiciary exists,
because it is necessary.
Second-It is the duty of the legislature not only to
regard the letter of the Constitution and thus relieve the
courts of the embarrassing duty of declaring the statute of
no force as in violation of constitutional limitations, but
every member of the assembly should feel himself charged
as the "agent and trustee" of his constituents with the duty
of scanning every bill in the spirit of the Bill of Rights, and
while recognizing that there is a wide field for legislative
activity in the framing of laws which will secure the prop-
erty, lives, health and general safety of the people; which
will enable them to enjoy those blessings for the better secur-
ing of which governments exist, he must always, remember
that we are a nation of freemen, and no law should be
inscribed on our statute book which is not in harmony with
the principles of liberty and the traditions, customs and daily
life Of a free people.
Richard C. Dale.
